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Abst ract - -We consider a single-period model with reallocation of excess demand such that two 
firms offer some product for customers who are uniformly distributed on a line segment market. This 
model results in one of the unit square games with pure strategies of continuous cardinary. Their 
purposes are to find the optimal ordering quantity that minimizes the total cost. We generate a
matrix by arranging the ordering quantity obtained in the usual way as one of the strategies for each 
player and analyze our model in a way to find an equilibrium pair. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. 
All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper,  we game-theoret ical ly  examine an inventory problem with two compet ing firms. 
The following papers,  which are mainly relevant o this paper,  have t reated a problem on an 
equi l ibr ium pair in inventory fields. Par lar  [1] has proved the existence and uniqueness of the 
Nash solut ion for the inventory problem with two subst i tutable products having random demands.  
L ippman and McCardle  [2] have examined the relation between equi l ibr ium inventory levels 
and the spl i t t ing rule and provide condit ions under which there is a unique equi l ibr ium for a 
compet i t ive version of the classical newsboy problem. A model represented in this paper  is 
considered as one of the special cases of their problem. Our model  differs from them and it 
contains a concept on time. 
In our paper,  we study a single-period model  with reMlocation of excess demand such that  two 
firms offer some product  to customers who are uniformly d istr ibuted on a line segment market ,  
where the word "reallocation" means that  a customer who finds the shelves empty  at a firm he 
first visits does not give up and may travel to another firm so as to satisfy his demand. In order 
to simplify a model,  we shall locate firms on both ends of a market.  They place orders at a 
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fixed per-unit cost, and they receive a prespecified revenue for each unit of products they sell 
to customers. Their orders must be placed prior to the arrival of their customers. As there is 
no initial inventory, the order quantity is the total amount available for sale. Their purposes 
are to find the optimal ordering quantity that minimizes the total cost given consideration to 
ordering, stockholding, and shortage in inventory. We deal with the cases in which demand is 
deterministic. We consider the ordering quantity obtained in the usual way as one of strategies 
for each player and generate a matrix by arranging them, and then analyze our model in a way 
to find an equilibrium pair. 
Our competitive model is introduced and the optimal ordering quantity is given in Section 2. 
In Section 3, we consider the optimal solutions obtained in Section 2 as one of the dominating 
pure strategies for each player and find an equilibrium pair by using their values. A numerical 
example is given in Section 4. We use a probability in the Huff model [3] with which customers 
first visit a firm in the example. Finally, we give some conclusions in Section 5. 
2. MODEL DESCRIPT ION 
Two firms, called Player I and Player II, simultaneously begin to sell some product o customers 
on the line segment [0, 1] and demand is split by these firms. Player I and Player II locate their 
firms at the point 0 and 1 in interval [0, 1]. Their initial inventory levels are zero. They place their 
orders only once at the beginning of a period. Their orders arrive without leadtime. They have 
no setup costs if they place orders of the products. The ordering costs are incurred in proportion 
to their ordering amounts. For each player, if they have some stock to sell, then they are charged 
holding costs. On the other hand, if they do not have any stock, then they are charged penalty 
costs. The players have a penalty in the sense that they lose their confidence if they have nothing 
to sell in inventory. We do not allow that they are backlogging. 
The customers are uniformly distributed along the line segment. Each of the customers goes 
to Player I with a probability p(x), which is dependent on his position x in [0, 1], and goes to 
Player II with the remaining probability 1 - p(x) so as to purchase one unit of the products. As 
soon as the customer knows that a firm he first visits has nothing to sell, he is sure to travel 
to another firm in order to satisfy his demand. Note that it is possible not to be satisfied with 
customers' demand. The customers start from their places at the same time and travel with the 
same speed. Then the arrival time taken from each of their positions to the firms is in proportion 
to the travel distance. Let (1/2)t denote the unit transference time. Then t is the time horizon 
under consideration if they wait for him until the time at which the last possible customer may 
come. For instance, if a customer who stays at point 0 first visits Player II and Player II has 
nothing to sell, he travels to Player I in order to satisfy his demand. The customers do not 
know inventory amount of players in any time. We assume that players know the opponent's 
unit ordering, holding, and penalty costs; however, they are noncooperative. The purpose of the 
players is to minimize the total cost, that is, the sum of ordering cost, holding cost, and penalty 
cost. Which strategies hould the players take to achieve their purposes? Here the ordering 
amounts are independently decided. We use the following notations in the model: 
b : the number of customers on a market, 
zi : the ordering amount, 
ci : the ordering cost per unit, 
r~ : the selling price per unit, 
hi : the holding cost per unit per unit time, 
p~ : the penalty cost per unit per unit time, 
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t : the planning period, 
Qi(T) : the inventory amount at time T, 
where i is player's number, i.e., i = 1, 2, and we have a natural assumption re > ci because they 
have to get their rewards. The ordering amount ze is a decision variable. 
We deal with the case of a deterministic demand. Then we suppose that b = 1 and ce = 0 
without loss of generality. Indeed, we choose the value Ze which satisfies their objective in integer 
values near the value obtained by multiplying demand b and real number, which minimizes total 
costs Ce(zl, z2) as the optimal solution when we solve this question for the optimal ordering 
amount z* Since b = 1, if they have positive holding costs he, we can restrict value ze to the 
l " 
interval [0, 1]. Then there arise six situations by the relation between the ordering amount ze and 
demand b. Define P(y) = foP(X)dx.  It holds 0 < P(9) <- 1 from 0 _< y <_ 1. P(1) represents 
total demand at the first step for Player I. Also 1 - P(1) represents total demand at the first step 
for Player II. We use the word "the first step" in the sense that customers first go to a player. 
SITUATION S1. Zl _~ P(1) and z2 >_ l -P (1 ) .  In this situation, players can supply the products to 
all customers; neither of them yields a shortage in inventory. All customers atisfy their demand 
at the first step. Because they have excess amount in inventory, we intuitively find they reduce 
it as few as possible. Then players will undoubtedly tend to reduce their inventory on hand as 
long as they have the holding costs. 
SITUATION $2. 0 < zt < P(1), z2 _> 1 - P(1), and Zl + z2 > 1. This situation supplies the 
products for all customers as in Situation 1. It yields the shortage in inventory on Player I side, 
and there are customers who have not satisfied their demand at the first step. However, all the 
customers who are not satisfied on Player I side are satisfied on Player II side. Since Player II 
has an excess amount in inventory, he reduces it as few as possible. Then he will choose the 
strategy z2 = 1 - Zl. Therefore, this situation is included in the following Situation 3. We are 
able to omit this situation in the model with a deterministic demand. 
SITUATION 83. 0 < Zl < P(1), z2 > 1 - P(1), and zl + z2 < 1. Player I has the shortage in 
inventory as Situation 2, and there are customers who have not satisfied their demand at the 
first step. However, not all the customers who are not satisfied on Player I side are satisfied on 
Player II side. As we consider the model with reallocation, we must regard this situation and the 
lower as important. 
SITUATION $4. 0 < Z 1 < P(1) and 0 _< z2 < 1 - P(1). The customers have only satisfied their 
demand by both players at the first step. If they are not satisfied by a player at the first step, 
they are never satisfied after this. This situation is important when penalty cost Pe is cheaper 
than holding cost he. 
SITUATION $5. Zl _> P(1), 0 <_ z2 < 1 - P(1), and Zl + z2 >_ 1. This case is the situation with 
roles exchanged between Player I and II on Situation 2. Then Player I will choose the strategy 
zl = 1 - z2. Because this situation is included in the following Situation 6, we can omit it. 
SITUATION $6. Zl >_ P(1), 0 < z2 < 1 -P (1) ,  and zl +z2  < 1. This is also the situation 
with roles exchanged between Player I and II on Situation 3. It yields the shortage in inventory 
on Player II side as well as Situation 5, and there are customers who have not satisfied their 
demand at the first step. However, not all the customers who are not satisfied on Player II side 
are satisfied on Player I side. We also think this situation to be important. 
Let S1 be a set satisfied by the conditions in Situation 1, that is, $1 = {(z~, z2) E [0, 1] x [0, 1] : 
zl _> P(1), z2 > 1 - P(1)}. And let $2 . . . . .  $6 define sets satisfied by the conditions in those 
situations as well as $1, respectively. Let Ci(zl,z2) represent he total costs per period for 
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where we define 
tl = min {T  
t2 = min {T  
t3 = min {T  
and 
t4 = min {T  
f 
2T/t } 
Zl = p(x)  dx , do 
/1 } = (1 -p (x) )  dx , Z2 -2T/t 
~01 ~21 } zl + z2 - p(x)  dx -  (1 - p(x))  dx -- 0 , -2T/t 
/21 } zl + z2 -1+ p(x) dx = O . 
T / t -1  
By this definition, t l , . . . ,  t4 are uniquely decided for each given pair of zl and z2. Here tl and t3 
are the times in which the inventory level of Player I reaches zero. Also t2 and t4 are the times 
in which the inventory level of Player II reaches zero. 
C*(Zl, z2) is a piecewise convex function in zi. Therefore, the search for the optimal inventory 
amount is simplified to finding a local minimum. The first-order conditions for finding the 
optimal z~ and z~ are given as follows: 
OC i (z,, z2) 
- 0, for i = 1, 2. 
Ozi 
It leads that the optimal inventory amount z~ minimizing C 1 (Zl, z2) for Player I is 
P(1) ,  in Sl, $5, 
P ( -~) ,  in $2, $3, and $4, 
1 1 
(1-p(x))dx- fl (1-p(x))dx, inS6 P(1) + -2t~/t --2t~/t 
And the optimal inventory amount z~ minimizing C2(Z1, z2) for Player II is 
where 
1 - P (1 ) ,  
1 - P - p(x)  dx, 
t l / t -1  
f l (1 - p(x))  dx, -2t~/t 
in $1, $2, 
in $3, 
in $4, $5, and $6, 
(3) 
(4) 
, , ( r l  + pl)t 
tl ----t3 -- (h l -{ -p l ) '  
t~ = q - (r2 + p2)t 
(h2 + p2) 
These rates have the form adding r i / (h ,  +p~) and critical values p i / (h i  +p, )  for a classical simple 
inventory problem. 
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3. THE EQUIL IBR IUM PAIR 
We obtained the optimal ordering amount z* in the preceding section. Those values obtained 
in each of the situations are the local optima in the model. Now we wish to obtain an equilibrium 
pair in the global. We shall consider z~ obtained above as one of the strategies for Player i. On 
the unit square games with pure strategies of continuous cardinary, there exists an equilibrium 
pair in those values. We analyze our model in a way to give a payoff matrix under these strategies 
and to find an equilibrium pair for Players I and II. Here we need to analyze it, dividing into at 
most eight price ranges on the following conditions: 
(A) 0 _< rl < (hi -p l ) /2 ,  0 _< r2 < (h2 -ps ) /2 ,  
(B) 0 _< rl < (hi - pl)/2, (h2 -p2)/2 _< r2 < (h2 - p2)/2 + (h2 +p2)(r l  +pi)/(hl  +Pl) ,  
(C) 0 < rl < (hi -p l ) /2 ,  (hs-p2) /2  + (h2 +p2)(r l  +pl)/(hl  +Pl )  < r2 < h2, 
(D) 0 < ri < (hi -p l ) /2 ,  r2 _> h2, 
(E) (hi -p i ) /2  < ri < (hi - p l ) /2 + (hi +pl) ( r2 +p~)/(hs +Ps),  0 _< r2 < (h2 - p2)/2, 
(F) (hi - p l ) /2 + (hi +p l ) ( rs  +p2)/(h2 +P2) -< rl < hi, 0 _< r2 < (h2 - p2)/2, 
(G) rl  _> hi, 0 _< r2 < (h2 -p2) /2 ,  and 
(H) otherwise. 
In each of these cases, we find an equilibrium pair from their pure strategies. Here we give one 
of these cases, (C). 
(C) 0 <_ rl < (hi - pl)/2, (h2 - p2)/2 + (hs +p2)(r l  +pl)/(hl  +Pi) <_ r2 < h2. 
Player I has two dominated pure strategies: I1 := P(1) and I2 := P(2(r i  + pl)/(hl + Pl)). 
Player II has two dominated pure strategies : IIi := 1 - P(1) and II2 :-- 1 - P(2(r l  +pl) / (hl  + 
Pi)) - P(1) + P((2rs - h2 +p2)/(h2 +P2)). Then deciding the index number of Ci for each pair 
of strategies, we obtain a following reduced payoff matrix: 
II1 II2 
I1 (CI( I I , I I1)  C1(I1,I12)) 
Is \Ca(I2,I I1) C3(I2,II2) " 
From the continuity of C i(zl, Z2) , we have the equality: 
C 1 (P(1), .) = C 1 (P(1), .). 
From C~(z~, z~) = C](z~, z~) and the optimality of C](zi, zs), the strategy I1 is dominated by 
the strategy I2. For the matrix reduced by domination, the strategy II1 is dominated by the 
strategy II2 because of the optimality of C2(zl, z2). Therefore, the equilibrium pair is (z~', z~) = 
(I2, II2). 
By using an analogous argument in other cases, it leads us to the following theorem. 
THEOREM 1. Let ki = 2(ri + pi)/(hi + Pi). This model is interpreted as one of the unit square 
games with pure strategies of continuous cardinary. We then have eight results on the conditions 
as an equilibrium pair: 
(A) (zt,z~)= 





(G) (z~,z~) = 
(H) (z~,z~)= 
(P(kl), k2 - P(1) + P(1 - k2)), 
(P(ki), 1 - P(1)), 
(P(kl),  1 - P(kl)  - P(1) + P(ks - 1)), 
(P(ki), 1 - P(kl)),  
(P(1), k2 - P(1) + P(1 - k2)), 
(ki - 1 + P(2 - ki) - k2 + P(1) - P(1 - ks), k2 - P(1) + P(1 - k2)), 
(1  - k2 + P(1) - P(1 - k2), k2 - P(1) + P(1 - k2)), and 
(P(1), 1 - P(1)). 
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4. AN EXAMPLE 
Huff is one of the researchers having formulated a probability of a customer at a given point 
traveling to a particular shopping center in a market. There are some models with force attracted 
customers. As an example, we make use of the probability in the Huff Model in this section 
because I think it is a brief and realistic model. It is in proportion to the size of a shopping 
center and in inverse proportion to the travel time from a customer's position to a shopping 
center. A formal expression of the model is 






Si -- the size of his firm for Player i, 
T~(x) = the travel time involved in getting from a customer's position x to the position of 
Player i, and 
A = a parameter which is to be estimated empirically to reflect the effect of travel t ime on 
various kinds of shopping trips. 
The parameter A is assumed to vary with different types of product classes. It usually uses a 
value between two and three. 
We assume two firms have the same size, and parameter A is assumed to be to the second 
power, that is, we apply $I = $2 and A = 2. Then we obtain the choice probabil ity 
(1 - x) 2 
p(x) - -  x2  + (1 - x) 2" 
By the use of this probabil ity and the numerical values hi = 2.9, Pl = 0.5, h2 = 2.5, P2 = 0.9, 
we give the values of equilibrium pairs represented in Table 1. 









































We considered a competitive model with reallocation of excess demand for two players. This 
model can be used as an inventory problem for the products which the customers will go to 
purchase when information of sale spreads to all customers at once. In the example, we applied 
the probabil ity in the Huff Model to p(x). As described in the above results, if hi < Pl and 
h2 _< P2, then Player I should take P(1) and II should take 1 - P(1) as their equilibrium pair. 
This is a normal solution. When values h~, Pi are given, we can consider various equilibrium pairs 
on the values of ri. Also, if hi > Pl or h~ > P2, they will regard the equilibrium pair except for 
(P(1), 1 - P(1)) as important. In particular, the values obtained in (C), (D), (F), and (G) are not 
able to get the results in one person's optimal policy and we feel to be most interested in them. 
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This model is formulated as the unit square game with pure strategies of continuous cardinary. 
As a consequence, cost functions become convex and pure strategies consist of equilibrium pairs 
in this model. However, we may consider it from a viewpoint of mixed strategies if functions are 
nonconvex. 
In our model, we restrict to only one order at the beginning of a period. However, we cannot 
consider that competitive players place orders of the products at the same time in a practical 
problem. So we will consider the model under different ordering time and/or different planning 
period. We will consider the extension to a multiperiod model. We treat the case in which 
customers do not know inventory amount of players at any time. Such information often passes 
from mouth to mouth in the world. We will be able to consider silent and/or noisy version for the 
information. We hope this paper becomes a step of research on competitive inventory problems. 
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